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“A Country Wonderfully
Prepared for their
Entertainment”
The Aftermath of the New
England Indian Epidemic of 1616
MATTHEW KRUER
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
Aformidable mythology has grown up around the Pilgrims and their voyage tothe New World. In the popular myth a group of idealistic religious reformers
fled persecution into the wilds of the New World, braving seas, storms, winter,
hunger, and death at the hands of teeming hordes of Indians, carving a new life out
of an unspoiled wilderness, building a civilization with naked force of will and an
unshakable religious vision. As with most historical myths, this account has been
idealized to the point that it obscures the facts of the Pilgrims’ voyage. When the
handful of separatists stepped onto the shores of New England in 1620, they did not
step into an untamed wilderness. They did not run into wild bands of ravenous sav-
ages bent on their destruction, nor did they ever have to contend with the full force
of nature’s fury. In fact, they walked into an abandoned village, whose inhabitants
had been gone barely long enough for weeds to grow over the tilled fields of corn.
They discovered caches of crops, tools, and other supplies, as if they were waiting
to be found and put into use by industrious hands. They moved quietly into a grave-
yard and built their shining example of a city on the hill directly on the still-exposed
carcasses of dead Indians.
The site they had chosen was of late the Indian village of Patuxet, which had
been wiped off the face of the earth a few years earlier by a plague the likes of which
the natives had never seen before. It was a virgin soil epidemic of biblical propor-
tions, which left no aspect of Indian society untouched. Economic networks crum-
bled and trade routes faltered; political boundaries and military fortunes changed
overnight as the relative strength of tribes fluctuated; even the religious beliefs of
many Indians were undermined, such was the power of this sweeping sickness. The
Pilgrims arrived into this maelstrom of terror, a world reeling from the body blow it
had just received and struggling desperately to reconstitute itself. And while the epi-
demic had a direct and appalling effect on the destiny of the Indians, through the fate
of the Indians it affected the Pilgrims as well. The Pilgrims invoked the epidemic
and its cataclysmic depopulation of the countryside time and again as proof that the
they were destined to rule New England, and they followed suit by following an
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aggressive policy of political subjugation. At the same time, the devastation of the
population and resulting demoralization caused by the ravages of an unstoppable
disease first allowed the Pilgrims to gain a toehold at Plymouth, then eventually
resulted in the long-term success of their designs for regional dominion.
The epidemic began no later than 1616. During that year the English explorer
Richard Vines wintered at the mouth of the Saco River and there witnessed the
natives suffering from a disease that his employer, Ferdinando Gorges, termed “the
Plague.”1 Though the epidemic affected the New England coast between the
Kennebec River and possibly Penobscot Bay to the north and Narragansett Bay in the
south, its effects seem to have been limited to those tribes that were involved in a
loose confederation with French traders, including the Massachusetts, Wampanoags,2
Pawtuckets, Pemaquids, Pennacooks, and Abenaki.3 The northern Abenaki mostly
hunted furs to trade for corn from the southern tribes, forming a network of trade
routes that helped the disease spread from one area to another. Notably, the
Narragansetts, who lived south of Narragansett Bay and traded with the Dutch, were
not appreciably affected by the epidemic.4
Diagnosis of the particular malady that afflicted the Indians of the Massachusetts
coast is problematic for several reasons. First, the dearth of eyewitnesses forces his-
torians to rely mostly on second-hand reports from surviving Indians, most of whom
conveyed their information through a formidable language barrier. The only two
Europeans who witnessed the epidemic firsthand were Richard Vines and Thomas
Dermer, of whom the latter visited the Massachusetts coast in 1619.5 Vines’ original
observations have not survived, and though they are reported through accounts left
by Ferdinando Gorges, this diffusion of information somewhat weakens their relia-
bility. Furthermore, the variety of sources that refer to diseases in the early days of
European colonization used exceedingly vague terminology and apparently applied
it more in a descriptive sense than a diagnostic one. Of the twenty-three contempo-
rary sources cited by Herbert Williams in his analysis of the 1616 epidemic, twelve
referred to the disease simply as “the plague.”6 Even a glance at some of these sources
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE HONORS COUNCIL
1 Ferdinando Gorges, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his Province of Maine, 3 vols., ed. James
Phinney Baxter (Boston: Prince Society Publications, 1890), 2:19.
2 referred to as Pokanoket in some sources, after the location of the largest village. In the
rest of this paper they will be referred to as Wampanoags, but the name used in quoted
sources will be left intact.
3 Sherburne F. Cook, “The Significance of Disease in the Extinction of the New England
Indian,” Human Biology 45 (1973): 485-508, quoted in Timothy Bratton, “Identity of the
New England Indian Epidemic of 1616-1619,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 62, no.
3 (1988): 352.
4 William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation, ed. William T. Davis (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 118; Nathaniel Morton, New Englands Memoriall, ed.
Howard J. Hall (New York: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1937), 31.
5 Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols., (Glasgow:
James MacLehose and Sons, 1905-7), 19:128-134.
6 Herbert Williams, “The Epidemic of the Indians of New England, 1616-1620,” The John
Hopkins Hospital Bulletin 20, no. 224 (1909): 340-349.
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reveals the loose sense in which the word is employed. For example, in Cotton
Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana, he refers to the same disease variously as “a
sweeping mortality,” “a prodigious pestilence,” and “an horrible and unusual
plague”—all on the same page.7 In Three Episodes of Massachusetts History, Charles
Adams commented, “In the seventeenth century the name “plague” was a convenient
one, popularly used in connection with any fatal epidemic the nature and symptoms
of which physicians did not understand.”8 Since most of the commentators were not
trained physicians but explorers, farmers, and businessmen, their descriptions cannot
be considered anything other than the observations of amateurs.
These considerations make a definitive identification of the 1616 epidemic
impossible. In his exhaustive analysis of the possible candidates for the disease,
however, the medical historian Timothy Bratton sets down these definitive facts: in
order to cause the horrific depopulation figures reported by various authorities, the
case mortality rate must have been between 50-75%; “the disease originated in
Europe and represented a classic ‘virgin soil’ encounter between Amerindians and
alien contagion”; the three definitive symptoms described by Vines, Dermer, and
later Gookin were a severe headache, lingering pockmarks, and a pronounced yel-
lowing of the skin.9 With these facts, and the above considerations, in mind, Bratton
produces three candidates which fit many, though not all, of the criteria for the epi-
demic. A diagnosis of bubonic plague is supported by the appalling mortality rate
and the disease’s ability to sustain its virulence through the winter, but the lack of
the necessary population density or any mention of the characteristic buboes weak-
en this case significantly. Additionally, in the early seventeenth century
Massachusetts possessed no significant rodent population and its climate was decid-
edly unsuitable for the Xenopsylla cheopsis flea, thus depriving the plague of its cru-
cial vectors.10 Bratton makes a novel case for a diagnosis of cerebrospinal meningi-
tis, citing its extraordinary case-mortality rate (as high as 77%), the immunity of the
carriers, and the incidence of both pockmarks and headaches as symptoms.11
However, this leaves aside the important criterion of jaundice. More importantly:
though meningitis has a high mortality rate, its attack rate—on the order of 3.5 cases
per thousand even among virgin populations—is far too low to cause the depopula-
tion described by later writers.12 Smallpox, on the other hand, possesses both the
necessary attack and mortality rate; its symptoms include the preceding headache
and resulting pockmarks; Europeans such as Vines and his party would have been
immune to its effects; and there is some paleopathological evidence of skeletal
deformities consistent with smallpox attacks on children.13 The most serious flaw in
SPRING/SUMMER 2003
7 Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, (Hartford: Silus Andrus, 1820), 49. Emphasis
in original.
8 Charles Francis Adams, Three Episodes of Massachusetts History, 2 vols., (New York:
Russel & Russel, 1965), 1:1
9 Bratton, “Identity,” 353-354.
10 Bratton, “Identity,” 369-372.
11 Bratton, “Identity,” 372-373.
12 Bratton, “Identity,” 374.
13 Bratton, “Identity,” 375-382.
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the smallpox case is the fact that a similar epidemic in 1633, described by Governor
William Bradford as “the small poxe,” struck the same populations affected by the
earlier epidemic.14 Billee Hoornbeek points out that the survivors of an earlier epi-
demic would have developed an immunity to the disease, whereas the 1633 outbreak
affected all ages indiscriminately.15 Despite the objections to its diagnosis, however,
smallpox remains the most likely candidate for the 1616 epidemic—if for no other
reason than because it raises fewer objections than any other theory of contagion.
Regardless of the nature of the disease, the devastation that it caused among the
affected tribes is incalculable. According to Sherburne F. Cook, “Opinion is unani-
mous on the part of those present at or close to the visitation of the plague that . . .
the mortality was extraordinarily high. Estimates range from roughly 75 percent
upward, with several flat assertions that in several places all the inhabitants died.”16
Cook also notes that evidence from the writings of John Smith—though they must be
accepted with a note of caution because of their imprecision—consistently describes
the decrease in population by a factor of ten, a mortality figure of 90-95%. Smith’s
contemporaries, including John White, Thomas Morton, and John Josselyn, provid-
ed similar estimates.17
Of course, the figures most often given by contemporary sources are in terms of
depopulation since most of them witnessed only the aftermath of the disease and not
its actual course through the Indian population. Thus, the figures quoted above reflect
the rate of overall depopulation rather than the actual case-mortality rate of the infec-
tion. Three other factors, therefore, must be taken into account in addition to the
immediate deaths due to the pathogen which caused the infection. Even assuming,
conservatively, a case-mortality rate of 50%, such a massive number of casualties in
the span of a few years would have caused a systemic breakdown in the functioning
of society. Tribes were suddenly deprived of leadership, both politically in the form
of their sachems, or chiefs, and spiritually in the form of their powwows, or medicine
men. The catastrophic loss of population resulted in a disruption of food production
due to a simultaneous loss of hunters and planters; moreover, the sick and dying were
a drain on the productive capacity of those still well enough to work. This inevitably
led to shortages, famine, and starvation.
Second, once the virulence of the contagion was fully realized, still-healthy
Indians abandoned their villages, as evidenced by the vast numbers of corpses and
skeletons left unburied. Thomas Morton described the scene of one long-abandoned
village in these grim terms: 
They died on heapes, as they lay in their houses; and the living, that
were able to shift for themselves, would runne away and let them dy,
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE HONORS COUNCIL
14 Bradford, Plymouth Plantation, 312.
15 Billee Hoornbeek, “An investigation into the cause or causes of the epidemic which deci-
mated the Indian population of New England, 1616-1619,” New Hampshire Archaeologist,
1976-1977, 19: 39, quoted in Bratton, “Investigation,” 376.
16 Sherburne F. Cook, The Indian Population of New England in the Seventeenth Century,
(London: University of California Press, 1976), 31.
17 Cook, Indian Population, 31.
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and let there Carkases ly above the ground without buriall. For in a
place where many inhabited, there hath been but one left a live to tell
what became of the rest; the livinge being (as it seemes) not able to
bury the dead, they were left for the Crowes, Kites, and vermin to
pray upon. And the bones and skulls upon the severall places of their
habitations made such a spectacle after my comming into those
partes, that, as I travailed in that Forrest nere the Massachusetts, it
seemed to mee a new found Golgotha.18
The flight of those unaffected, or those whose infection was still in the incubation
stage, not only resulted in the immediate deaths of those who were too sick to care
for themselves but also served to further spread the infection to new areas.
Lastly, the Indians lacked any appropriate model of contagion and thereby per-
sisted in practices which encouraged the spread of disease. For example, Edward
Winslow describes the custom of Indians “when any, especially of note, are danger-
ously sick, for all that profess friendship to them, to visit them in their extremity.”19
Thus, the response of Indian communities to the epidemic was to summon powwows
along with the friends and relatives of the ill. All these people would be packed into
a single wigwam for an extensive vigil, providing the disease ample opportunity to
find new hosts. The combination, then, of a virulent disease impacting an unprotect-
ed population, social breakdown and starvation, neglect of the sick, and simple igno-
rance was responsible for the decimation of the Massachusetts coast Indian tribes.
All this had a pronounced psychological effect on the Indians, one that is all the more
important because the plague was connected from the start with Europeans. Cotton
Mather reports that
A Frenchman who had not long before these transactions, had by a
shipwreck been made a captive among the Indians of this country,
did, as the survivors reported, just before he dyed in their hands, tell
those tawny pagans, that God being angry with them for their
wickedness, would not only destroy them all, but also people the
place with another nation . . . those infidels then blasphemously
replyed, God would not kill them; which blasphemous mistake was
confuted by an horrible and unusual plague, whereby they were con-
sumed in such vast multitudes that our first planters found the land
almost covered with their unburied carcases; and they that were left
alive, were smitten into awful and humble regards of the English, by
the terrors which the remembrance of the Frenchman’s prophesie had
imprinted on them.20
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18 Thomas Morton, New English Canaan, ed. Charles Francis Adams (New York: Prince
Society Publications, 1883), 132-133.
19 Edward Winslow, “Good News from New England,” in The Story of the Pilgrim Fathers as
told by Themselves, their Friends, and their Enemies, ed. Edward Arber (London: Ward &
Downey, 1897), 547.
20 Mather, Magnalia Christi, 49.
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Though the French sailor’s curse was disdained by a proud and mighty race of
Indians, the epidemic that ravaged the countryside soon after was attributed to the
vengeful wrath of the European God.21 As a natural corollary to this supposition, the
Indians believed their own gods were displeased with their sacrifices. The
Wampanoags interpreted the fact that the Narragansett tribe was almost entirely unaf-
fected by the epidemic as a sign that their enemies remained in the protective grace
of their god Cautantowwit, while their own god, Kietitan, had forsaken them. In addi-
tion, Neal Salisbury contends that this formidable collusion of divine malevolence
was compounded by retribution from beyond the grave. They believed that their rel-
atives, resentful of having been abandoned and denied a dignified burial, were
responsible for turning the spiritual forces in nature against them.22 Thus, it was evi-
dent to the decimated tribes that an alignment of supernatural powers was responsi-
ble for their doom. 
Therefore, there are two aspects to the Indians’ psychological reaction which
must be taken into account. First is the debilitating effects of a traumatic event, a phe-
nomenon well-documented by modern clinical and experimental psychologists. The
initial shock of a disaster on the scale of the 1616 epidemic causes a long-term psy-
chological shift. This results in depression and anxiety; the traumatized individual
becomes paralyzed with feelings of powerlessness.23 The aftereffects of the epidem-
ic were exacerbated by the view among the Indians that they had somehow brought
the sickness upon themselves, and thus were ultimately responsible for their own
misfortune. The interaction of these two psychological effects resulted in a profound
shift in the worldview of the Indians. The proud defiance that John Smith had noted
in his earlier expeditions gave way to an attitude of submission.
The Indians were defeated not only psychologically, but militarily as well—
before the Pilgrims ever arrived on the shores of New England. The once mighty
Wampanoags, according to Cook’s analysis able to field more than 1,000 warriors,
were reduced to a meager handful. Though the Wampanoags were not as heavily
affected as the Massachusetts—who were reduced from a strength rivaling that of the
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21 Alfred W. Crosby, “GodÉ Would Destroy Them, and Give Their Country to Another
PeopleÉ” American Heritage 29 (1978): 6, 39; Nathaniel Morton, New Englands
Memoriall, ed. Howard J. Hall (New York: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1937), 27.
22 Neal Salisbury, “Squanto: Last of the Patuxet,” in The Human Tradition in Colonial
America, ed. Ian K. Steele and Nancy L. Rhoden (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources,
1999), 28. Also, Thomas Morton mentions that the Indians usually bury their dead ceremo-
niously, but that the social breakdown caused by the epidemic resulted in the abandonment
of those rituals. See Morton, New England Canaan, 132.
23 Marianne Amir, Zeev Kaplan, and Moshe Kotler, “Type of Trauma, Severity of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Core Symptoms, and Associated Features,” Journal of
General Psychology 123: 4, 348. Most of the psychological literature regarding traumatic
experiences has necessarily focused on the individual and attempts at rehabilitation. For
the purposes of this paper, the results of studies done on individuals and isolated groups
have been generalized to the level of a society, since the psychological reactions of individ-
uals to a common traumatic event will naturally have an aggregate effect on the entire
society.
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Wampanoag to a pitiful 60 warriors—the decimation of their fighting population led
to what Salisbury considers a militarily untenable situation.24 Against the nearly unaf-
fected Narragansetts they could not hope to maintain their previous territorial bound-
aries. Between 1616 and 1620 the Narragansetts became increasingly aggressive, by
Russell Thornton’s account advancing past the Seekonk River towards Massachusett
and Wampanoag lands. They drove the Wampanoags from several islands in the
Narragansett Bay and pushed them in between the Weekapaugs and Pequots near the
current border between Rhode Island and Connecticut.25 The Wampanoags tried to
consolidate the shattered remnants of previous bands under the leadership of strong
sachems, such as Massasoit and his brother Quadaquina, but eventually they were
forced to seek terms from their traditional enemies. Massasoit humbled himself
before the Narragansetts, gave up his claim to the Narragansett Bay, and entered into
an expensive and humiliating tributary relationship.26
The epidemic had economic implications for the Indians as well. Having barely
one tenth of the number of hunters it once had, tribes found that they could not field
nearly enough beaver pelts and otter skins to satisfy fur-hungry French and English
traders. Salisbury maintains that, as the number of pelts available for trade dwindled,
so too did the number of European traders willing to make a stop for so unprofitable
a harvest, especially when there were so many rich hunting grounds as yet untapped
in the vast reaches of the New World.27 Though trade between northern and southern
tribes still existed—they had become far too interdependent to stop the exchange of
fur and corn altogether—it was an economic system that had been shattered by demo-
graphic realities, and all the tribes in the French trade coalition suffered for it.
Furthermore, the Wampanoag’s economic universe was not only crippled by a loss of
income through trade, it was also drained of vital resources by their subordination to
the Narragansetts. 
This, then, was the Indian population that a threadbare group of English separatists
encountered in the winter of 1620: devastated by disease, politically divided, and eco-
nomically crippled. The Pilgrims, however, were by no means caught unawares by the
disarray of the coastal Indians. On the contrary, certain European entrepreneurs had
been eyeing New England for years and saw that the effects of the epidemic had
cracked the country wide open to the opportunity for colonization. Principal among
these was Ferdinando Gorges, who had sponsored several of the earlier English voy-
ages to the area around present-day Massachusetts. Captain Thomas Dermer wrote to
him that he had found “some antient Plantations, not long since populous now utterly
void; in other places a remnant remaines, but not free of sicknesse.”28 Sensing an oppor-
tunity for profit, and encouraged by reports that all along the coast the Indians were
weakened by the passage of disease, Gorges sought a charter for the territory under the
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24 Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New
England 1500-1643 (New York: Oxford, 1982), 103.
25 Russell Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since
1492 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 171.
26 Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 105.
27 Salisbury, “Squanto,” 29.
28 Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimes, 129.
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auspices of a newly formed joint stock company. Salisbury explains that, after receiv-
ing Dermer’s letter, “Gorges was more optimistic than ever about realizing his colonial
ambitions. For what Vines and Dermer had conveyed above all was the utter weakness
of the surviving coastal Indians, especially their vulnerability to European microbes
and power.”29
Gorges’ initial attempts to found a viable New England colony consisted of
entirely male crews. His attempt to maximize the military strength and potential labor
power of any undertaking also undermined the cohesion of the settlement.
Supporting a radical departure from this precedent, a group of adventurous financiers
agreed to provide the capital for the voyage of a group of Leyden separatists to New
England. They hoped that families, each an economically self-sufficient unit, would
give the colony a more firm foundation. The Pilgrims were allowed to settle under an
agreement that the assets and profits of their settlement would belong to the joint-
stock company for seven years, at which time they would be divided among the
shareholding partners.30
One hundred and two Pilgrims arrived at Cape Cod in November, 1620, but it
was not until March of the following year that they were able to successfully contact
the native inhabitants. The military commander of the small group of colonists,
Captain Miles Standish, and several of his men encountered a few Indians and a dog
in the woods while attempting to find an auspicious location for permanent settle-
ment, but the natives fled on sight of the Englishmen. Though they attempted to fol-
low, Standish and his men were no match for Indians traversing in their own terrain,
and they gave up the chase upon finding a deserted village, complete with “new stub-
ble” of corn, “many walnut trees full of nuts, and a great store of strawberries, and
some vines.”31 In all of the exploratory journeys mounted by Standish and his men in
the weeks that followed, they found little but small frightened bands, abandoned vil-
lages, and graves.32 Though they were disappointed at their inability to make contact
with the natives, the Pilgrim explorers took advantage of the provisions that had been
left behind:
We marched up to the place where we had the corn formerly, which
place we called Cornhill, and digged and found the rest, of which we
were very glad. We also digged in a place a little farther off, and
found a bottle of oil. We went to another place which we had seen
before, and digged, and found more corn, viz. two or three baskets
full of Indian wheat, and a bag of beans, with a good many fair wheat
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30 William Bradford, “Negotiations with Master Thomas Weston, Merchant; and the
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Corinth Books, 1963), 21.
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ears. Whilst some of us were digging up this, some others found
another heap of corn, which they digged up also, so as we had in all
about ten bushels, which will serve us sufficiently for seed. And sure
it was God’s good providence that we found this corn, for else we
know not how we should have done, for we knew not how we should
find or meet with any Indians, except it be to do us a mischief.33
Though the Pilgrims were by nature a devoutly religious group and therefore
inclined to attribute fortuitous events to the will of God, the frequent references made
to divine providence in their chronicles should not be discounted as insignificant
zealotry. Indeed, the Pilgrims suffered from a host of difficulties upon their arrival in
New England. They had arrived several months later than intended due to some
inauspicious weather, rendering impossible the prospect of planting a crop to get
them through the first winter. They had brought enough supplies only for the sea voy-
age, and began to run low on food even as Standish’s party tried to find a site well
suited for settlement. According to Cotton Mather, it was only that cache of corn dis-
covered among ruins of deserted villages that allowed them to escape “the terrible
famine.”34 Moreover, the Pilgrims were acutely aware that they were alone in a vast
and harsh wilderness, surrounded and outnumbered by barbarous peoples. The corn
they found in abandoned villages, then, gave them the means to survive the first win-
ter and to begin planting in spring, while the tangible lack of a native presence had
two implications. First, even having been aware of the epidemic and the resultant
mortality, the Pilgrims had expected to run into resistance of some sort, as the pas-
sage from Mourt’s Relation implies. The lack of any concerted or consistent hostili-
ty allowed the tiny band of settlers to gain an early foothold in New England. Second,
Indians fleeing the epidemic had left behind prime areas of real estate which the
Pilgrims simply expropriated. Sites such as the one chosen for Plymouth, actually
built on top of the former village of Patuxet, had exceptionally fertile land that had
already been laboriously cleared by its previous inhabitants, access to fresh water, a
natural harbor teeming with fish, and even a naturally defensible hill which was even-
tually made into a fort.35
All of these factors reinforced the Pilgrims’ notion of themselves as the chosen
people of God. The invocation of “Divine Providence” occurs for almost every aus-
picious occurrence in the early history of the Pilgrims, from the finding of corn and
beans to the propitious emptiness of villages. But this is much more than simply
attributing good luck to a celestial benefactor. The Pilgrims realized that their good
fortune was largely due to the effects of a devastating contagion; providence had sim-
ply taken the form of an epidemic which had swept the land clean of savages in order
to make room for them and their vision of a society dedicated to God. Indeed, later
writers were explicit about their enthusiasm for the epidemics which so weakened the
Indians. Increase Mather wrote in 1631, “About this time the Indians began to be
quarrelsome touching the Bounds of the Land which they had sold to the English, but
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God ended the Controversy by sending the Smallpox amongst the Indians of Saugust,
who were before that time exceeding numerous.”36 Displaying similarly unabashed
sentiments, Cotton Mather wrote, “The Indians in these parts had newly, even but a
year or two before, been visited with such a prodigious pestilence; as carried away
not a tenth, but nine parts of ten (yea, ‘tis said nineteen of twenty among them): so
that the woods were almost cleared of those pernicious creatures, to make room for
a better growth.”37 The obvious fact that God had shown His favor for the Pilgrims at
the expense of the Indians formed a critical early concept of what was and was not
acceptable in the course of colonization. That God had accomplished His designs
with such brutal force led the Pilgrims to believe that a similar ruthlessness on their
part was merely a fulfillment of God’s intentions.
To the Pilgrims, then, the epidemic had a psychological effect every bit as
powerful as it did on the Indians, only in the opposite direction. Where the estab-
lished economic system of the Indians was shattered, for the pilgrims the boon of
crops gave them an unexpected head start on the road towards self-sufficiency;
while the Wampanoags were forced into humiliating submission to their enemies,
for the Pilgrims the epidemic wiped away the native population and with them the
very political force which they had feared most; and whereas the Wampanoags saw
an alliance of spiritual forces against them, the Pilgrims saw themselves as the van-
guard of divine will. The auspicious events of the founding of Plymouth provided
a crucial psychological stimulus, steeling their collective will to endure the harsh
winter ahead.
That first winter was a brutal one, costing the colony half its population through
hunger, exhaustion, and various diseases of which scurvy was the most deadly.38 At
times during the winter there were as few as six or seven men among the Pilgrims
well enough to care for the sick—which, of course, means that only that many would
have been available to defend the colony in case of an attack.39 Such a tiny contin-
gent, even with their terrifying firearms, could not hope to defeat the nearby
Wampanoags under Massasoit. The heart of the historical problem lies here, in the
grip of that terrible winter, during the Pilgrims’ moment of greatest weakness. Why
didn’t the Wampanoags attack their enemies when they were most vulnerable? There
was certainly ample reason for the Wampanoags to make themselves enemies of the
Pilgrims; their hatred of the English stemmed from repeated violations at the hands
of earlier explorers. For example, in 1615 Captain Thomas Hunt was left behind in
New England to finish gathering a catch of fish and haul it back to Spain. In addition
to the fish, Hunt kidnapped twenty Wampanoags from Patuxet and seven Nausets,
later selling them into slavery.40 So it was not indifference, and certainly not kindness,
which spared the Pilgrims. If even a decimated Indian population could have turned
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Plymouth into another lost colony like Roanoke, what kept them from wiping
Plymouth off the face of New England?
Instead of fighting them, Massasoit chose to forge an alliance. His tribe watched
the Pilgrims struggle through the winter, keeping a cautious distance. They decided
to break the impasse in March of 1621. One day the Pilgrims marveled at the sight
of a tawny Indian strolling into Plymouth, asking in plain English for beer, biscuits,
butter, cheese, pudding, and duck.41 This was Samoset, a Wampanoag who had
learned English among the fishermen along the coast of Maine. He, along with a cap-
tive from Patuxet named Tisquantum (or, more commonly, Squanto), served the crit-
ical role as translators and diplomatic liaisons between the Pilgrims and various
native groups. Beginning with the exchange of small gifts such as hunting knives and
beads, the Pilgrims attempted to open a dialogue with the local sachem through their
new found English-speaking assets. Squanto eventually arranged a meeting between
some of the Pilgrim leaders and Massasoit for the purpose of drawing up a treaty of
nonaggression:
1. That neither he [Massasoit] nor any of his should injure or do hurt
to any of our people.
2. That if any of his did any hurt to any of ours, he should send the
offender, that we might punish him.
3. That if any of our tools were taken away while our people were at
work, he should cause them to be restored; and if ours did any harm
to any of his, we would do the like to them.
4. If any did unjustly war against him, we would aid him; if any did
war against us, he should aid us.
5. He should send to his neighbor confederates, to certify them of
this, that they might not wrong us, but might be likewise comprised
in the conditions of peace.
6. That when their men came to us, they should leave their bows and
arrows behind them, as we should do our pieces when we came 
to them. 
Lastly, that doing thus, King James would esteem of him as his friend and ally.42
There is no evidence to suggest that Massasoit was ever under the illusion that the
treaty with the Pilgrims made his people an equal partner in a military alliance. On
the contrary, the Wampanoags sought out the Pilgrims in order to transfer their trib-
utary allegiance from the Narragansetts to the Pilgrims. Salisbury’s analysis asserts
that, in the final calculus of power politics, the Pilgrims demanded less tribute, sub-
jected them to less humiliation, offered more gifts and prestige, allowed a superior
level of military protection, and strengthened the Wampanoag’s tribute-collecting
powers among neighboring tribes.43 With their strength so drastically diminished by
SPRING/SUMMER 2003
41 Heath, Mourt’s Relation, 51.
42 Heath, Mourt’s Relation, 57.
43 Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 116.
  
96
A COUNTRY WONDERFULLY PREPARED
the demographic implosion in the wake of the 1616 epidemic, the Wampanoags knew
they could not rule their neighbors as they once had. Left with the choice of submis-
sion to a traditional rival, the Narragansetts, or to the Pilgrims, the Wampanoags
chose the Pilgrims. Massasoit’s actions were a direct and calculated response to a
political crisis caused by the disastrous epidemic. He chose to ally with the Pilgrims,
rather than destroy them, because they seemed to be an insignificant threat compared
to the Narragansetts. Governor Bradford himself implied in his History of Plymouth
Plantation that Massasoit had acted strategically in response to the Narragansett
threat by taking shelter with the English.44
From the point of view of the Indians, to whom treaties were dynamic agree-
ments based on shared hospitality and mutual obligation, the agreement with the
Pilgrims was nothing out of the ordinary. It pledged that both sides would remain at
peace with each other, honor each other’s laws, and defend each other against mutu-
al enemies. But the Pilgrims had a very different interpretation of the treaty. After list-
ing the provisions of the agreement in New Englands Memoriall, Nathaniel Morton
continues matter-of-factly, “All of which he [Massasoit] liked well, and withall at the
same time acknowledged himself content to become the Subject of our Soveraign
Lord the King aforesaid, His Heirs and Successors; and gave unto them all the Lands
adjacent, to them and their Heirs forever.”45 Having no experience with written doc-
uments or English law, Massasoit could not have realized that in agreeing to the last
clause of the treaty he was, in the eyes of the Pilgrims, ceding his territory and his
authority to King James. While he may have understood the treaty to be placing his
people in a subordinate position, he could not have known that the Pilgrims meant
that he was ceding his sovereignty to King James forever. As the Pilgrims understood
it, Massasoit acknowledged himself to be a loyal subject of the King in perpetuity;
there would be no renegotiation of terms, no alteration in status as the Wampanoags
regained their former strength. Though in this case these mutually incompatible def-
initions were merely a case of cultural misunderstanding, the Pilgrims’ concepts of
sovereignty, and their strategy in drawing the Indians into a treaty, reflected their
overarching designs for political supremacy of the region surrounding Plymouth.
The roots of the Pilgrims’ political strategy lay in their desire for territorial secu-
rity. Whereas the French and Dutch traders that had been in contact with the New
England Indian tribes for decades had established an extensive trade network, from the
start the English were more interested in direct exploitation of resources. According to
Salisbury, the English focused primarily on commodities such as sassafras and fish,
with the eventual goal of bringing Indian land under their cultivation; they therefore
had little use for extensive cooperative trade with the natives and looked at goods like
beaver pelts as little more than supplementary income.46 As a result, the Pilgrims’ colo-
nial strategy was largely an insular one, aiming at long-term self-sufficiency with trade
flowing towards Europe, not the Indians. The Pilgrims and the Indians were thus at
odds, each group static and impermeable, by necessity competing for survival in a
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zero-sum game. In an environment where cooperation was impossible, or at the very
least unthinkable, a successful economic operation required control of local tribes. 
The alternative to cooperation and coexistence was outright oppression in the
style of the Spanish conquistadores. Standish based his military strategy on the
assumption of a population besieged by numerically superior natives, much like
John Smith, who Salisbury maintains emulated the infamous conquistador Hernan
Cortes.47 Smith based his argument on the assumption that the English would be
transposing their society more or less intact, without extensive commingling of
populations. Salisbury elucidates the tacit assumption behind these beliefs: if the
first settlers were vastly outnumbered by the Indians, they would have to rely on
brute force and even terror to maintain control.48 Like Smith, Standish was a mili-
tary man, a solider with extensive experience in the Dutch wars, to whom the con-
quistador model—in which coercion and even outright slavery are the only meth-
ods which yield results—seemed natural. Of course, Smith concocted this strategy
based on observations made in 1614, before the epidemic hit New England and the
coastal tribes were at the height of their military strength. So when Standish draft-
ed this policy into action, it succeeded beyond his wildest dreams, largely because
the population was too sparse to put up even a fraction of the resistance that Smith
had anticipated.
In 1621 the Wampanoags were shattered and feeble, completely unable to
defend themselves against their traditional enemies. The Pilgrims exploited the mil-
itary vulnerability of the Wampanoags, as well as their desire for allies against the
Narragansetts, first to ensure their survival and then to gain the upper hand. This was
a subtle transformation of policy, and the shift from avoiding hostilities to coercing
supplies and eventually enforcing obedience occurred in increments. The first step
was simply placing the Indians in a binding treaty in which several clauses make it
clear that the Indians are inferior to the Pilgrims. For example, the second clause,
reading, “if any of his did any hurt to any of ours, he should send the offender, that
we might punish him,” essentially insists that the Wampanoag sachem enforce
English law among the natives of his own tribe as well as those of his neighbors.
This includes a provision by which rule-breakers would be handed over to the
Pilgrims to be dealt with by their own justice.49 The Pilgrims thus simultaneously
empower Massasoit by giving him authority, in their name, over various neighbor-
ing tribes, and then limit that authority by disallowing him to administer punish-
ments. In essence, argues Salisbury, this turns Massasoit into an agent of political
control.50
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But the machinations of the Pilgrims were not all Machiavellian intrigue; part of
their strategy included outright bids for dominance. In the tender days of the colony
this dominance manifested itself as little more than a cavalier disregard for native
customs. For example, one of the first acts of the Pilgrims upon striking land was to
rifle mass graves in search of food and seed, an act that no one could seriously have
believed would go unnoticed.51 Other actions were not quite so flagrantly offensive
to religious sensibilities, but just as effectively breached the code of conduct among
allies that the Indians inextricably associated with friendly conduct. The Pilgrim
insistence on near total segregation, for example, by refusing to lodge traveling
Indians in Plymouth, offended the notion of reciprocal hospitality by which dynam-
ic treaties were upheld among Indians.52 This essentially gentle claim to dominance
through independence soon transformed into a policy of coordinated oppression. 
This shift towards an increasingly overt domination of the Indians was occa-
sioned by a perceived shift on the part of the Indians towards greater hostility. The
aggressiveness and intransigence of the English position could not help but arouse
native anger. Moreover, the Wampanoags were not united in espousing a policy of
coexistence. Far from enthusiastically welcoming them, many of the Wampanoags
held to their earlier enmity towards the English, resenting the Pilgrims’ presence so
much that they were willing to join with their previous enemies, the Narragansetts.
Under Massasoit’s leadership they accepted the terms of political subordination
offered by the Pilgrims, but it took only a charismatic personality to convince them
that the Pilgrims needed to be destroyed. Driving Massasoit out of his village, an
Indian named Corbitant challenged the Pilgrim position in New England by captur-
ing their two most essential allies, their translators Squanto and Hobbamock, and
holding the former prisoner at Nemasket. The latter escaped and informed the
Pilgrims of Corbitant’s intentions to form a Wampanoag-Narragansett alliance to
destroy the Pilgrims, whereupon Standish mounted an emergency rescue on
Squanto’s behalf and extracted an apology (in absentia) from Corbitant.53 The
Pilgrims’ reaction to this brief insurrection was to tighten their control over friendly
tribes. Shortly after the Nemasket incident, the Pilgrims pressed their neighboring
tribes into a far more explicit acknowledgement of English authority. “Several of the
Indian Sachems”—some of the most prominent of the surrounding area, in fact,
including the recalcitrant Corbitant, Massasoit’s brother Quadaquina, Canacum of
Monomet, and Epenow, who had been responsible for Captain Dermer’s death the
previous year—“came unto the Government of New-Plimouth, and acknowledged
themselves to be the Loyal Subjects of our Soveraign Lord King James, and sub-
scribed unto a Writing to that purpose with their own hands.”54
Whereas the Pilgrims were able to take advantage of the Wampanoag’s weak-
ness to craft an alliance in which they were the dominant partner, to deal with the
Narragansetts they were forced to rely on intimidation and fear. For, as previously
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noted, the Narragansetts were largely untouched by the epidemic and retained their
military strength. Indeed, into the vacuum left behind by the dying and scattered
tribes the Narragansetts expanded their influence until they were the dominant power
in the region. They naturally viewed the Pilgrims as political rivals and wanted the
English presence broken so that they would be able to continue dominating the
coastal tribes. Bradford wrote that the Narragansetts “(since the death of so many of
the Indeans,) thought to dominire and lord it over the rest, and conceived the English
would be a bar in their way.”55 The failure of Corbitant’s coup made it clear that the
Pilgrims were neither an insignificant nor transitory regional power, and soon after
the Narragansetts made overtures towards more explicit hostilities. The Narragansett
sachem Canonicus sent to Governor Bradford a bundle of arrows wrapped in snake-
skin, a symbol that Squanto informed them was a traditional challenge. In reply,
Bradford stuffed the snakeskin with gunpowder and shot and returned it to
Canonicus.56
Nothing ever came of the Narragansett challenge. Whether they were afraid of
the Pilgrims or calculated that the cost of fighting them was not worth the potential
benefits, it is impossible to know; there is no direct evidence left by the Narragansetts
as to what informed their decision, and the Pilgrim chroniclers did not bother to spec-
ulate. What is known is that Canonicus refused to accept Bradford’s counter-chal-
lenge and in so doing gave up the Narragansett claim to tributary rule over the
Wampanoags, formally abandoning them, Salisbury explains, to the Pilgrims’ sphere
of influence.57 In response to the threat of Indian attack, Standish militarized the
fledgling colony, organizing every able-bodied man into a militia and erecting a
defensive perimeter around Plymouth.58 He also redoubled his efforts to cow the
Indians into submission, relentlessly bullying them to capitulate to English demands.
For example, while Standish tried to procure corn from the Indians at Mattachiest,
one of them stole some beads from him. Standish responded by threatening to mas-
sacre the whole tribe unless his property was immediately restored.59 Though it
should be said in his defense that the Pilgrims never shed civilian blood in order to
accomplish political goals, the consistent threat of violence cannot be considered
anything other than terrorism.60
Whether he carried out his threats or not, Standish’s repressive regime had the
intended effect. His bullying tactics and the perpetual threat of violence placed fur-
ther strain on a psychologically exhausted Indian population. After withstanding the
full force of an epidemic and the resulting social collapse, political upheavals and
demographic shifts, they now had to deal with a ubiquitous sense of fear that
Standish and his men worked hard to instill. As modern social psychologists have
noted, the propagation of a regime based on fear crystallizes the population in a state
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of permanent anxiety, helplessness, and vulnerability.61 The sociologist Theodore
Kemper has proposed a model of structural emotions to explain the effective subju-
gation of one group by another. According to this theory, an attitude of subjection
ensues in a group which views the insufficiency of its power vis-ˆ-vis the dominant
group to be their own fault. A similar view of the inferior group’s status results in
depression. Both emotions contribute to social paralysis and effective dominance by
the more powerful group.62
The Pilgrims’ native allies, as well as the Narragansetts, were responsible for the
Pilgrims’ reactionary tightening of control. Squanto made the best of his privileged
position with the Pilgrims to warn them of conspiracies among the Wampanoags,
Narragansetts, and Massachusetts, apparently attempting to reconstitute the survivors
of Patuxet into a single band under his leadership.63 Simultaneously, among the
Wampanoags Squanto claimed that the English controlled the disease and that he
could persuade them to direct it at his enemies.64 Similarly, other Wampanoags,
including Hobbamock, manipulated the Pilgrims into believing that Squanto was
betraying them to enemy tribes. Thus, the Pilgrims were caught in the middle of com-
peting Indian intrigues, various factions playing on their fears of conspiracy and
attack in order to advance their own interests. In the end this was a disastrous policy
for all the Indians involved, for the Pilgrims reacted not by decisively siding with any
of the factions but by adopting a bunker mentality towards all natives, reinforcing
their perceived imperative for absolute control of the territory surrounding Plymouth
in order to ensure their survival.
The high point of crisis occurred soon after the founding of the neighboring
English colony of Wessagusset (also known as Weymouth). In 1622 Thomas Weston,
who had helped the Pilgrims find financial backers for their voyage to New England
two years earlier, called in Plymouth’s debt by requesting their aid in the establish-
ment of a colony of adventurers. A poorly organized scheme composed mostly of
profit-seeking bachelors, the Wessagusset colony began inauspiciously and quickly
deteriorated to the point of crisis. Sixty men arrived just north of Plymouth destitute
of food or any other vital supplies, calling upon the Pilgrims to lend them the neces-
sary provisions. At this time the Pilgrims were still dependent on Indian corn pro-
cured through trade or coercion, as they would continue to be for a further year, and
were hardly in a position to take on the burden of so many unproductive adventurers.
Though Plymouth complied with the demands, the men of Wessagusset soon ran out
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE HONORS COUNCIL
61 Sofia Salimovich, et. al., “Victims of Fear: The Social Psychology of Repression,” in Fear
at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America, ed. Juan E. Corradi, Patricia
Weiss Fagen and Manuel Antonio Garret—n (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992), 74-54, 89; Harry C. Halloway and Carol S. Fullerton, “The Psychology of Terror
and its Aftermath,” in Individual and Community Responses to Trauma and Disaster: The
Structure of Human Chaos, ed. Robert J. Usano, Brian G. McCaughey, and Carol S.
Fullerton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 40.
62 Theodore Kemper, A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1978), 56-58, 63-65.
63 Salisbury, “Squanto,” 31-33; Morton, New Englands Memoriall, 35vidence, 123.
64 Bradford, Plymouth Plantation, 128; Morton, New Englands Memoriall, 35.
  
101
MATTHEW KRUER
of corn and resorted to stealing from nearby Indians in order to survive. Any sem-
blance of law and order disintegrated, Governor John Sanders lost control of his
colony, and some of the men began plotting to attack the nearby natives and take their
corn by force. A message asking for Governor Bradford’s advice aroused the suspi-
cions of the Massachusetts that the Pilgrims would cooperate in such an attack.
Consequently, the Indians of Monomet refused to trade their customary supply of
corn, leading to Pilgrim suspicions of a conspiracy among the Indian tribes. Indeed,
Massasoit confirmed Winslow’s fears by telling him of a vast Massachusett coalition
that involved all of the Indian tribes of Cape Cod, Capawak (Martha’s Vineyard), and
even tribes as far north as Agawam (Ipwich). Standish’s response was swift, brutal,
and precise. Acting on Massasoit’s advice, he assassinated seven leaders of the
Massachusetts, including Wituwamet and Pecksuot.65 In fine English style,
Wituwamet’s head became an ornament for the spikes of the Pilgrims’ new fortress.
The effect of the Wessagusset incident was decisive on Pilgrim-Indian relations.
The Wessagusset colony disbanded, and Standish used the ostensible uprising as a
pretext to impose even more rigid terms of Pilgrim authority. Already militarily crip-
pled by disease and now deprived of their leadership, the Indians of the Cape Cod
area were in no position to resist the expansion of the Pilgrim’s political sphere. As
for the Wampanoags, though Massasoit won them the Pilgrims’ esteem for their loy-
alty, in the end they were no better off than any of the other Indian tribes. As the
Pilgrims slowly grew stronger, continually reinforced by supplies and colonists from
Europe, the Wampanoags were left with no choice but to accept the terms of an
increasingly lopsided alliance. Once they tied their political fortunes to the Pilgrims
in hopes of winning reprieve from the domination of the Narragansetts, the
Wampanoags could not then abandon their alliance without reverting back to
Narragansett control. Slowly, but inexorably, they slid into oblivion as their fierce
independence faded into a feeble subservience to a power they dared not desert.
The 1616 epidemic had two profound effects on the Indian population of
Massachusetts, both of which in turn profoundly affected the fledgling colony of
English separatists. First, the contagion scoured the land practically clear of its pre-
vious inhabitants, allowing the settlers to establish themselves at Plymouth. The
Pilgrims, in essence, arrived into a vacuum. Though small in number and weakened
by hunger and disease, they survived largely because they faced no resistance from
any hostile natives and were able to occupy superior land. Second, the plight of the
Wampanoags in the aftermath of the epidemic left them in a profoundly demoralized
state, seemingly locked in political subjection to an enemy tribe. Demographic and
military realities led them to seek an alliance with the Pilgrims that would allow them
to escape the political orbit of the Narragansetts. Once allied to the Pilgrims, howev-
er, they were riding on the proverbial tiger’s back. They could not turn against the
Pilgrims, even as the settlers grew stronger and more demanding, for that would
make them vulnerable to the Narragansetts once again. As a result, they tolerated the
Pilgrims’ belligerent conduct because they had no better alternative. 
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For the Pilgrims, the epidemic was nothing less than the handiwork of God.
Cotton Mather summed up their attitude elegantly in Magnalia Christi Americana:
“The good hand of God now brought them into a country wonderfully prepared for
their entertainment, by a sweeping mortality that had lately been among the
natives.”66 Had it not been for the corn they discovered, there would have probably
been famine; had it not been for the cleared fields they found, their crops would like-
ly have failed; had it not been for Massasoit’s sheer political desperation, they would
have been annihilated during the first winter. As they began asserting themselves as
a regional power, they were successful primarily because of a combination of fear
and calculation on the part of the Indians. Enemies like the Narragansetts hesitated
before attacking what appeared at times to be an imposing foe, and neighboring tribes
such as the Wampanoags willingly entered into an alliance which would slowly turn
them from ostensible partners into tributary subordinates. The Wampanoags’ actual
inferiority to rival tribes, combined with their perceived inferiority to the Pilgrims,
locked them into their alliance with the Pilgrims. Thus, the success of Plymouth, and
especially the effectiveness of their strategy for regional domination, was largely due
to the complex cascade of effects that rippled through Indian society in the wake of
the epidemic of 1616.
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